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Mediator strategies in New Zealand: 
the views of the mediated. 
John M. Howells and Susan H. Cathro* 
• 
Mediation is a process in which an impartial neutral (or a chairman with no right of 
decision) assists the disputants in settling their differences. The mediator's role is to 
facilitate voluntary agreements by the parties themselves; the parties' final decision is their 
own and not the mediator's. A mediator (and, for that matter, a conciliator in a dispute 
of interest) tries to persuade the disputants to reach a voluntary' agreement by using 
strategies that fall short of outright arbit~ation. Because the philosophy and practice 
of mediation tend often to be nzisunderstood, this paper examines some of these strategies 
and the importance attached to then1 by employers and union officers. It offers some 
insight into what industrial relations practitioners consider to be the strategies most likely 
to lead to successful mediation. 
Introduction 
Despite the fact that the Industrial Mediation Service (IMS) was introduced in 1970 
as a rather novel addition to dispute-resolution procedures, research interest in mediation 
in New Zealand has been limited. There is, of course, no real "theory" of mediation and 
perhaps the subtleties and intangibles of the process do not lend themselves to systematic 
analysis. On the other hand, it may be felt that the m,ediation process is so simple, obvious 
and elementary that there is nothing to research; all that can be expected is analysis that is 
essentially descriptive and pragmatic. Given that much of mediation is confidential - thus 
leaving little or no documentary trace - there is an element of truth in the suggestion 
that "one can do little more than define it and wish it well" (Cullen, 1968, p. 53). 
However, since it became fully operational towards the end of January 1972, there has 
been a remarkable increase in the number of disputes handled by the IMS. The extent to 
which New Zealand employers and unions have been willing to utilise this particular forn1 
of third-party intervention in conflict situations is clearly illustrated in Table 1. 
Table 1 Disputes involving the Mediation Service and Conciliation Service, 1973-1982 
Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Mediation 145 117 274 367 343 5 57 593 712 84 7 769 
Service 
Conciliation 399 266 4 70 517 540 571 593 570 602 570 
Service 
* John Howells is an associate professor in the Department of Economics, University of Otago. Susan 
Cathro is a research assistant in the same Department. They thank the Social Sciences Research 
Fund Committee for a research grant to study aspects of mediation in New Zealand. 
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Given this level of response. especially in the years after 1977, it seetned appropriate 
to tnark the first decade of actual n1ediation with a research project which explored the 
attitudes of ernployers and union officers to the IMS and to the tnediation process itself. 
Although the research thrust was specifically directed at the views of industrial relations 
practitioners over a wide range of topics, this paper exan1ines their attitudes to the single 
issue of strategies used in n1ediation. 
Research background 
The project was based on a questionnaire survey conducted over a period of 4 weeks in 
Dunedin, Christchurch, Wellington and Auckland. In this tirne, it was hoped to cover 
a sample population of at least 200 union officers and rnanagetnent representatives ·with 
experience in n1edia tion and conci1ia tion. In fact, 218 con1pleted questionnaires were 
returned fron1 116 ernployers and 102 union officers. This san1ple size cotnpares favour-
ably with sin1ilar studies in the United States and the United Kingdon1. \ It 1neant that the 
san1ple included n1ost of New Zealand's n1ajor con1panies. Since tnany of the union secre-
taries who were interviewed act for n1ore than one union, the satnple also covered a large 
proportion of private sector unions. As shown in Table 2, a total of nearly 220 respondents 
. 
Table 2 .l:)nployers and unionists responses by industrial classification 
Etnployers Unionists 
Industrial Classification No. % No. % 
Agriculture, Forestry, Mining 9 7.8 4 3.9 
Man ufact urin g 47 40.5 23 22.5 
Electricity, Gas, Water ? 1 . 7 ? 2.0 
-- -
Construction 1 0.9 10 9.8 :l 
Con1n1erce 4 3 . 4 6 5.9 
Transport 5 4.3 12 11.8 
Services 21 18.1 25 24.5 
Others 7 6.0 12 11 .8 
Not Appropriate 20 17.2 8 7.8 
Total 1 1 6 102 
gave a reasonable spread across all industry groupings and, therefore, guaranteed that the 
attitudes of employers and union officers in all sectors were adequately represented. It was 
decided in the early planning stages that a postal survey would not have given a satisfactory 
response rate. There \vere n1ore than 50 specific questions, and tnany of these sub-divided 
so that each individual was required to give 139 separate answers to cotnplete the 18 pages 
of the questionnaire. This \Vas considered a rather daunting exercise for those with heavy 
work schedules. The alternative was intensive field work to interview all potential res-
pondents in order to discuss the research, explain aspects of the questionnaire approach 
and encourage participation in the project. The Employers Associations in Otago-
Southland, Canterbury, Wellington and Auckland were asked to prepare detailed lists of 
their affiliates kno\vn to be active in industrial relations in general and tnediation and 
conciliation in particular. A11 listed individuals were then interviewed and firn1 arrange-
nlents were made for the questionnaire either to be picked up by one of the researchers 
1 See Landsberger (1960), \Veisenfelf (1962), Berkowitz et a/. (1964). Research on the attitudes of 
the parties to conciliation in the United Kingdom (Goodin an and Krislov, 1974) was based on a 
satnple of 128 Inanageinent representatives and 95 union officers. 
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or to be mailed to the University in Dunedin. A similar procedure was followed for all 
field officers employed by the 4 Employers Associations.. For union officers, lists were 
prepared from the Federation of Labour's Trade union directory, but otherwise the inter-
view programme was identical to that adopted for employers. The approach, admittedly, 
was time-consuming. Yet it see1ned the best way of providing the type of infonnation 
so necessary for a wider appreciation of the mediation process in New Zealand. 
The strategies of mediation 
It is difficult to generalise on the question of how to mediate. There is no set formula 
which points out what strategies a mediator should use in different situations. The actual 
combination of strategies will depend on the issues in dispute, the economic strength of 
each party, the economic and social importance of the company's operation, the timing 
of entry, the atmosphere in the cotnmunity, the personalities of the disputants and, ob-
viously, the personality of the mediator. This suggests that it is impossible to develop a 
single set of strategic propositions appropriate for all mediation cases. Nevertheless, it 
should be possible to identify a nu1nber of broad strategies around which mediation re-
volves. Kenneth Kressel, for exatnple, suggests that, in practice, mediation boils down to 
3 sets of strategies {Kresse!, 1972): reflexive, non-directive and directive. His is a sequential 
view of mediation and implies that the 3 sets of strategies will parallel the particular 
stages of the settlement process. 2 
Early in the dispute, tl1e mediator will adopt reflexive strategies. These attempt to 
establish the groundwork upon which his later activities will be built. At this point, 
efforts are directed at gaining the trust and confidence of the parties, identifying the real 
leaders and understanding the relationship between the disputants. Later, a mediator will 
start to apply non-directive strategies aimed at increasing the probability that the parties 
themselves - with a minimum of manipulation from a mediator - will reach an acceptable 
solution to the dispute. This is a "mid-wifery kind of mediation" (Kressel, 1972, p. 13). 
During this stage, a mediator will try to create a favourable climate for negotiation by 
patient listening, controlling hostility, trying to resolve the easier issues early on and gener-
ating positive expectations that agreement will finally be reached. The last stage of 
directive strategies refer to the mediator's active and vigorous attempts to deliberately 
pressure and manoeuvre the parties into ending a dispute. Forcing the parties to face 
reality, pressing them to change their bargaining positions, making substantive sugges-
tions for settlement and generally applying pressure to settle are all part of a more aggre-
ssive or "caesarean approach to mediation" (Kressel, 1972, p. 13). 
Kresse} 's classification has been accepted by other researchers in a useful and convenient 
summary of the types of strategies that might be expected of mediators at different stages 
in a dispute (Kochan and Jick, 1978; Gerhart and Drotning, 1980). It certainly offers a 
taxonomy of strategies capable of general application. In terms of the present study., it 
seemed to provide an effective framework for investigating the frequency with which par-
ticular strategi~es are used in N~ew Zealand and the importance attached to them by employ-
ers and union officers. 
The frequency of particular strategies 
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to specify how frequently certain 
strategies are used by a mediator (or conciliator) acting as chairman without right of deci-
• sion. This was done by having them rate each one of 16 strategies on a 4 point scale from 
"Very Often", "Often", "Not Often" to "Never". It must be acknowledged that this 
requires a great deal of sophistication from respondents; to accurately recall what different 
2 That the choice of appropriate strategies is r~elated to different points in the negotiating process 
has also been argued by Walton and McK~ersie (1965), Stevens (1967) and Kochan (1973). 
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mediators had atte1npted to do in previous disputes is not an easy task. Nevertheless, 
the frequency with which each strategy occurs in mediation (based on percentage responses 
in each of the 4 categories) is given in Table 3. The evidence clearly shows that all strate-
gies are frequently used by mediators. Even though the formal organisation of mediation 
in New Zealand differs markedly from other countries, it would appear that the essential 
strategy "mix" inside the actual mediation process is basically the same. 
Table 3 Total group percentage responses by the frequency of mediator strategies 
Strategies 
Reflexive 
Getting the trust and confidence of the parties 
Identifying the real issues in dispute 
Identifying the real leaders 
Understanding the relationships between the 
disputants 
Non-Directive 
Explaining how mediation will proceed 
Controlling hostility 
Trying to solve n1inor issues early on 
Patient listening 
Controlling the pace of meetings 
Keeping the parties talking 
Directive 
Making suggestions for compromise 
Pressing hard for compromise 
Trying to force the parties to face reality 
Trying to move the parties from positions 
previously held 
Helping the parties to save face 
Trying to change the parties' expectations 
Very Often Not Never Total 
Often Often Responses 
43.0 
39.2 
27.9 
23.3 
38.5 
22.2 
27.2 
44.7 
20.8 
32.4 
38.6 
30.3 
15.0 
21.3 
18.7 
13.5 
46.9 
49.8 
39.7 
60.5 
39.9 
53.2 
39.3 
49.0 
45.4 
57.5 
46.6 
39.4 
50.7 
52.6 
51.0 
49.0 
9.6 
11.0 
26.0 
16.2 
19.7 
21.7 
32.5 
6.3 
30.9 
10.1 
14.3 
27.9 
31.9 
23.2 
27.4 
35.1 
0.5 
6.4 
1.9 
2.9 
1.0 
2.9 
0.5 
2.4 
2.4 
2.9 
2.9 
2.4 
209 
209 
204 
210 
208 
207 
206 
206 
207 
207 
210 
208 
207 
207 
208 
208 
However, there are interesting differences in the frequency with which some strategies 
are introduced. These differences deserve closer scrutiny. When all the strategies are 
ranked both by percentage responses in the single category "Very Often" and by percen-
tage responses in the combined category "Very Often" and "Often", the least frequently 
used strategies are always the 2 that try to force the parties to face reality and try to 
change the parties' expectations. These are both directive strategies. Again, 4 out of the 6 
directive strategies are in the lower half of the frequency ranking based on percentage 
responses in the category "Very Often", 5 out of the 6 directive strategies are in the lower 
half of a frequency ranking based on percentage responses in the combined category "Very 
Often" and "Often". Although all strategies are frequently used, it would seem that med-
iators in New Zealand are much more inclined to adopt a passive than an aggressive role in 
mediation. Mediators may have accepted all of the strategical underpinnings of mediation, 
but one strongly suspects that there still remains "the mistaken impression that his role will 
be less active than an arbitrator" (Grills, 1979, p. 30). 
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The importance of particular strategies 
The frequency of mediator strategies offers a very brief insight into the strict mechanics 
of the mediation process. However, the importance attached to these strategies by the 
sample of employers and union officers is perhaps of greater concern. To gauge how im-
portant these 2 groups consider the various mediator initiatives to be in helping to 
resolve industrial disputes, respondents were asked to rate the same 16 strategies on a 
4 point scale from "Very Important", "Important", "Doubtful Importance" to "Not 
Important". In Table 4, it is interesting to note how close agreement is between the 
Table 4 Employers (E) and unionists ( U) percentage responses by the importance attached 
to mediator st~ategies. 
Reflexive 
Getting the trust and confidence 
of the parties 
Identifying the real issues in dispute 
Identifying the reallead·ers 
Understanding the relationships 
between the disputants 
Non-directive 
Explaining how m~ediation will 
proceed 
Controlling hostility 
Trying to solve minor issues early on 
Patient listening 
Controlling the pace of meetings 
Keeping the parties talking 
Directive 
Making suggestions for compromise 
Pressing hard for compromise 
Trying to force the parties to 
face reality 
Trying to move the parties from 
positions previously held 
H·elping the parties to save face 
Trying to change the parties' 
expectations 
Very 
Important 
E u 
65.2 68.8 
86.1 83.2 
31.6 32.6 
36.0 47.4 
19.3 37..9 
27.0 38.3 
27.2 41.5 
46 . 1 50..5 
20.9 25 . 5 
44 . 7 60.2 
21.1 32.3 
13.9 10.8 
36.8 23.7 
19.3 12.6 
26.3 26.9 
17.9 8.6 
Important Doubtful Not Total 
Importance Important Responses 
E u E u E u E u 
32.2 25.8 1.7 5.4 0.9 115 93 
13.0 16.8 0.9 115 95 
51.8 39.1 14.0 20.7 2.6 7.6 114 92 
50.9 42.1 12.3 10.5 0.9 114 95 
56.1 38.9 21.9 18.9 2.6 4 . 2 114 95 
58.3 45.7 14.8 11.7 4.3 115 94 
43.0 30.9 27.2 23.4 2.6 4 . 3 114 94 
48.7 45.2 5.2 4.3 115 93 
53.9 39.4 23.5 26.6 1.7 8.5 115 94 
46.5 33.3 8.8 6.5 114 93 
69.3 52.7 8.8 15.1 0.9 114 93 
40.9 33..3 35.7 40.9 9.6 15.1 115 93 
43..9 50.5 17.5 17.2 1.8 8 . 6 114 93 
58.8 44.2 20.2 35.8 1.8 7.4 114 95 
55.3 33.3 15.8 28.0 2.6 11.8 114 93 
56.3 36.6 24.1 47.3 1.8 7.5 112 93 
groups in their ranking of strategies considered important for successful mediation. Em-
ployer and union officer rankings by percentage responses in the category '"Very 
Important" and the combined category "Very Important" and "Important" correlate 
highly (p = 0.82 and 0.88 respectively). There is a general consensus over the ranking of the 
4 strategies considered the most important and the 2 considered the least important. 
There is little doubt that industrial relations practitioners believe that identifying the real 
issues in dispute, getting the trust and confidence of the parties, patient listening and 
keeping the parties talking are strategies central to the mediation process. Less enthusiastic 
support for pressing hard for compromise and trying to change the parties' expectations 
is significant because it underlines the fact that much less importance is attached to the 
directive strategies of mediation. In fact, a distinct lack of relish for an assertive, strong-
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ann approach by mediatotl II 
of percentage responses ill the 
Five out of the 6 directiv. 
both by employers and 
is ranked fifth by emplopra aad .a 19 
It can be argued that this ltl8teD' ia d1e llut 
tors go much beyond offering settlement optioJW, dtay 
dling" (Miller, 1983, p. 35). 
The close agreement between en1ployen and wdoa ~ 
gies is repeated, to some extent, in their percentage to the 
In the combined category "Very Important" and " tile ,.,_ 
ponses are separated by less than 3 percentage points for 8 oat or the 10 
non-directive strategies. When the weight of percentage telpCillll are ~ 
in the categories "Very Important" and "Important" for the 6 · · "' 
things stand out. First, the percentage responses from UDion officen are COillillelltlf 
lower than from employers. Secondly' the gap between the 2 sroups ia especiaDy J88tbd 
in the case of trying to change the parties' expectations, helping the parties to aaw face 
and trying to move the parties from positions previously held. Although tile evidence 
again confirms a reluctance by both parties to embrace directtre strategies, it is obviolll 
that this reluctance is much stronger for union officers than it is for employe1s. 
Some implications 
The results drawn from the research on the attitudes of the mediated to mediation 
clearly show that industrial relations practitioners are a little uncomfortable with 
sive mediation. This, one suspects, has created a vicious circle: because the partie& are 
uncomfortable with directive strategies, mediators tend not to be ve; because 
mediators are not aggressive, the parties get more used to passive strategies; because the 
parties commonly face passive strategies, they become uncomfortable in situations wllere 
the mediator tries to be intense and assertive. There is always the risk, of course, that 
aggressive behaviour by a mediator will irritate and antagonise the parties. However, 
a legitimate concern with mediator acceptability and maintaining the good will of the 
parties should not disguise the fact that, at some point in the process, mediators neell to 
be as much involved in ploys and strategems as either of the disputants. It may be neees-
sary for a mediator to assume the role of forceful advocate for a variety of reasons. The 
parties, for example, may not be able to deternline what is really important in the dispute; 
they may have become too concerned with certain solutions and lost that flexibility to 
consider other approaches; they may not realise that alternative solutions do exist; they 
may be constrained by ''political" forces from putting forward new proposals. At this 
stage, it might be better that mediators be criticised for being too aggressive rather than 
for being too timid, dull, listless or too unimaginative. 
Miller makes the valuable point that no acceptable scheme has yet been devised to 
measure the effectiveness of neutrals in disputes procedures (Miller, 1983, p. 28). Never-
theless, there is some recent evidence that active and aggressive mediator strategi.es appear 
to be somewhat more successful than passive strategies. Although the impact of directiPe 
strategies are a little more decisive in dealing with non-wage issues than they are With wqe 
issues, they do help in narrowing the differences between disputants even when is$pes 
remain unsettled. A point of interest from American experience, given the lukewarm 
support for directive strategies from New Zealand unionists, is that aggressive strategies 
are more likely to persuade unions rather than employers to ~e concesaioos dUI'IDi 
mediation (Kochan and Jick, 1978). A comprehensive study of fnl,paae procedures 6y a 
team from Case Western Reserve University established that intense mediation is more 
frequently used by private or ad hoc mediators than full-time agency mediators (Gerlwt 
and Drotning, 1980). The agency mediator, continually moving from case to case, cannot 
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be expected to maintain that high level of intensity and concentration over a sustained 
period that is at the heart of assertive mediation. However, research data again supports 
the finding "that more intense behavior by a mediator is associated with greater progress 
in negotiations and a greater likelihood of settlement" (Gerhart and Drotning, 1980, 
p. 101). 
Although fresh evidence, admittedly from overseas experience, points to the fact 
that intense mediation should be encouraged, changing New Zealand attitudes to accept 
more frequent use of directive strategies will take time. The tendency for the more aggres-
sive form of mediation to be carried out by ad hoc mediators in the United States has al-
ready been noted, but that alternative does not really exist in thls country. The IMS 
does not have attached to it teams of suitably qualified private or "home-town" mediators. 
The heavy work load carried by its staff of 6 mediators, therefore, makes it extremely 
difficult for them to sustain the momentum required of intense mediation ov~er long 
periods of time. Furthermore, intense mediation can be rather unpleasant; being totally 
committed to obtaining a settlem~ent might ev.en involve ''deliberate deception" (Stevens, 
1963, p. 129). Many disputants will not ~easily be persuaded to accept aggressive mediation 
as the route to fmal settl~ement. They will prefer, in certain circumstances, to fall back 
on section 64(4)(e) of the Industrial Relations Act - which allows t11e mediator to 
arbitrate - rather than submit to the pressures of aggressive mediation. Indeed, a pattern 
is alr·eady beginning to emerge: the New .Zealand neutral commonly enters a dispute "as 
a mediator and may leave as an arbitrator" (Miller, 1983, p . 29). 
Finally, a more ~enthusiastic approach to the use of directive strategies is not without 
some cost in tenus of potential long-run alienation of certain parties from agency 
mediators. The private mediator can take the risk of irritating the parties by his aggressiv~e 
behaviour because he may never again have to face them. For the full-time agency 
mediator, the likelihood of once more n1eeting up with one or other of the disputants 
is much greater and so maintaining rapport with the parties is crucial for his future 
effectiveness. This cost might be considered totally unjustifled when evidence giv·en in 
Tables 5 and 6 suggests that the parties are more than reasonably satisfied with the media-
tion process as it presently operates . 
• 
'Table S Employe~s and unionists responses by whether the Mediation Service has made a 
positive contribution to .labour - management relations. 
Group 
Employ·ers 
Unionists 
No. 
80 
65 
Yes 
% 
70.2 
65.7 
No. 
13 
19 
No 
% 
11.4 
19.2 
No. 
21 
15 
Not sure 
% 
18.4 
15.2 
Total 
114 
99 
Table 6 Employers and unionists responses by whether settlement would be .more .difficult 
without mediation. 
Yes No Not sure 
Group No. % No. % No . % 'Total 
Employers 92 80.0 14 12 . 2 9 7.8 115 
Unionists 67 68.4 21 21.4 10 10.2 98 
• 
• 
• 
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Conclusion · 
Mediation is an art, not a science. It II 81 attllltc 
set of detenninants of the of da8 
employed by individual mediators. Given the of ltJ'III <- tl» 
sity of approaches) adopted by it il not 41111)' 
tial strategies of mediation. This has helped to a .,.... 
mediation process. This paper tries to mnove of tllil 
it is possible, in fact, to recognise 3 broad sets ofstraleiJies. a 
framework in which to measure the frequency that certaiJt stnr&a&llsate 
and the importance attached to these strategies in terms of 
the basic approach has been essentially descriptive, the paper 
question. Will the mediation process in New Zealand be if 
greater willingness to adopt (and employers and union officers display a 
to accept) more aggressive mediator strategies? 
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